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Abstract A large body of literature suggests that consumers derive utility from gains
and losses relative to a reference point. This paper shows that such reference depen-
dence can affect savings in opposite directions depending on whether people face
liquidity constraints. Existing models for wealth and intertemporal choice predict
that reference dependence reduces savings, but these models abstract from liquidity
constraints. Introducing a liquidity constraint, I find that reference dependence can
increase optimal savings for people without access to credit. Ex post, after reference
points have been formed, liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of an
income loss in early periods, inducing those who are reference dependent to concen-
trate the full loss in early periods and save in order to eliminate future losses. Further,
anticipating a liquidity constraint raises the expected level of future consumption and
thus the expectations-based reference point for future periods, creating an ex-ante
savings motive. These findings underscore that it is important to account for finan-
cial market imperfections when applying or testing reference-dependent models in
low-income settings, and potentially explain heterogeneity in howmuch the poor save
when facing binding liquidity constraints.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect access to credit hampers the poor’s ability to smooth consumption. Intro-
ducing credit can therefore have significant welfare effects (Karlan and Zinman 2011;
Banerjee et al. 2015; Angelucci et al. 2015), but quantifying these effects requires a
better understanding of the poor’s preferences and behavior (Harrison 2011). Most
analyses of intertemporal choice in a context of imperfect credit markets assume that
consumption levels determine well-being and that it is optimal to smooth consump-
tion.Violations of consumption smoothing are often explained by reference-dependent
behavioral life-cycle models (Shefrin and Thaler 1988), including features of Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory. That is, gains and losses relative to a
reference point determine well-being; losses are more painful than gains are pleasant
(“loss aversion”); and marginal utility is decreasing in the size of a loss, i.e., utility
from losses is convex (“diminishing sensitivity”).1
To date, reference-dependent models for wealth and intertemporal choice have
largely abstracted from liquidity constraints. It is hence unclear how reference depen-
dence affects savings for the poor, who often do not have access to credit, and how
credit impacts theirwell-being if they indeed do have reference-dependent preferences.
This paper fills this gap by introducing a liquidity constraint in existing models for
reference-dependent preferences, and I find that reference dependence can have qual-
itatively different effects depending on whether consumers face liquidity constraints.
Compared to the reference-independent optimum, reference dependence reduces sav-
ings among those who can borrow, but can increase savings when credit is unavailable.
This poses a challenge to applying existing reference-dependent models for wealth
and intertemporal choice in low-income settings.
I demonstrate this result using three distinct models that differ in how consumers
form their reference points (see Table 1). The first is a standard model for prospect
theory in which gains and losses compared to an exogenous reference point determine
well-being. In this model, a person compares actual and reference consumption levels,
and the reference level can be interpreted in various ways, for instance as a predeter-
mined expectation, a habit, status quo, recent ownership, or consumption level of a
social reference group. Although the model is intuitive, it offers the discretion to select
any reference point explaining the empirical fact in question. This comes at the cost
of many degrees of freedom (Barberis 2013).
The second and third models build on Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2009), who pos-
tulate that endogenous beliefs held prior to consumption shape the reference point and
that updating these beliefs—comparing actual and planned utility in the framework
adopted here—influences well-being. By loss aversion, bad news is more painful than
good news is pleasant, and by diminishing sensitivity, it is better to receive bad news
in one go rather than in bits. A growing literature (e.g., Abeler et al. 2011; Crawford
and Meng 2011; Ericson and Fuster 2011) supports these assumptions. Moreover, the
model can explain several anomalies in the literature on information preferences and
intertemporal choice, in particular why people increase consumption immediately in
1 For reviews discussing the empirical evidence of prospect theory, see Edwards (1996) and Camerer
(2004).
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Table 1 Overview of model features by section
Section Reference point
formation
Gain–loss utility
derived from
comparing…
Diminishing
sensitivity
satisfied?
Income risk
anticipated?
Effect of
liquidity
constrainta
2 Exogenous …actual vs reference level Yes No Ex-post
3 Endogenous beliefs …actual vs planned utility Yes No Ex-post, Ex-ante
4 Endogenous beliefs …actual vs planned utility No Yes Ex-ante
a Ex-post: higher savings because the liquidity constraint prevents consumers from delaying losses to future
periods, making it optimal to concentrate losses in the present and eliminate future losses. Ex-ante: higher
savings because the liquidity constraint prevents consumption smoothing when present income is relatively
low, increasing expected future consumption (and thus the expectations-based reference point) relative to
expected present consumption
response to good income news but delay cuts following bad news about their wealth
or income (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2009).
These models have not been analyzed for consumers with limited access to credit.
To assess how missing credit markets and reference dependence interact, I intro-
duce liquidity constraints in each of these models. I consider a setting in which
the sole savings motive for reference-independent people is to smooth consump-
tion, meaning that reference-independent consumers save when present income is
higher than future income, and either borrow (if unconstrained) or live hand-to-mouth
(if liquidity-constrained) when present income is lower.2 My main finding is that
reference-dependent savings are often higher in the face of liquidity constraints,
even though unconstrained savings are unambiguously lower than the reference-
independent optimum.
Depending on the model used, this asymmetry is driven by either an ex-post effect
of liquidity constraints on feasible savings levels or an ex-ante effect of liquidity
constraints on expected consumption.As such, liquidity constraints shape the reference
point and indirectly affect behavior.
Ex post, when income is below the reference point in both early and future peri-
ods, reference-dependent consumers prefer to borrow and avoid early losses, reducing
optimal savings compared to the reference-independent optimum, but this is not viable
in the presence of a binding liquidity constraint. By diminishing sensitivity, i.e., con-
vex loss utility, their second-best option is to take the full loss immediately and save
to eliminate future losses, increasing optimal savings. Instead of receiving bad news
regarding both present and future consumption, the consumer cuts present consump-
tion and receives bad news in one go. Expectations regarding future consumption
hence turn into an aspiration to save and maintain future consumption at the planned
level. This ex-post mechanism is observed independent of whether the reference point
is exogenous or endogenous, as long as diminishing sensitivity is satisfied.
2 I hence analyze whether liquidity constraints create reference-dependent savings motives beyond a self-
insurance motive. The final section discusses the implications of reference dependence among consumers
with precautionary savings motives in more detail.
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Ex ante, in the model with endogenous reference points, the mere anticipation
of a binding liquidity constraint will affect expected consumption and hence the
expectations-based reference point. When income is lower in early periods than in
future periods, liquidity-constrained people cannot smooth perfectly. They expect
higher consumption in future periods, increasing their reference level and thus the
marginal utility from future consumption. As a result, when income in early peri-
ods turns out not to be too bad, a loss-averse consumer may prefer to save even if
reference-independent models predict hand-to-mouth consumption. This aspirations-
based savings motive can be observed even when diminishing sensitivity is not
satisfied.
This paper contributes by highlighting two novel savings motives from interacting
reference dependence and liquidity constraints. The literatures on intertemporal choice
in imperfect credit markets and reference dependence have been fairly separated. The
finding that liquidity constraints alter how reference dependence influences behav-
ior is relevant for empirical studies aiming to identify such preferences outside the
laboratory (see Camerer 2004; Barberis 2013 for reviews). So far, these studies have
not considered how missing credit markets may confound estimates of loss aversion
and diminishing sensitivity. I show that for people without access to credit markets,
reference dependence can affect savings qualitatively different from what we would
expect on the basis of existing models. Moreover, if consumers act in line with the
framework presented here, introducing credit will have different behavioral effects
and welfare implications than previously assumed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the model with exoge-
nous reference points. Section 3 introduces a liquidity constraint into Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009), a model with endogenous reference points, loss aversion, and dimin-
ishing sensitivity, and examines how savings respond to unanticipated income shocks.
Using a similar framework but without diminishing sensitivity, Sect. 4 studies savings
for loss-averse consumers who know that income is stochastic when forming their
beliefs. Section 5 discusses limitations and economic implications of the models I
presented. Section 6 concludes.
2 Case I: Exogenous reference points
2.1 Model for intertemporal choice with exogenous reference points
First consider a framework with exogenous reference points. This tractable model
illustrates how referencedependencemay increase savings in the presenceof a liquidity
constraint ex post: When a liquidity constraint prevents consumers from delaying
losses to future periods, it is optimal to concentrate losses in the present and eliminate
future losses.
The model includes two periods t ∈ {1, 2}: the present, t = 1, and the future, t = 2.
In period t , a person earns deterministic income wt , summarized in a 2 × 1-vector
w ≡ {w1, w2}. The person chooses how much to consume in the present, c1, and
how much to save, w1 − c1. To stay close to the literature on savings and liquidity
constraints, the savings technology is a risk-free buffer stock with zero returns, for
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instance savings in the home, an informal savings group, or a zero-interest rate bank
account.3 By a regular budget constraint, the person consumes her savings and w2 in
the future, c2 = w1 + w2 − c1. To reflect the stylized fact that the poor often lack
access to formal credit and are unable to borrow, the person faces a liquidity constraint,
c1 ≤ w1.4
Preferences are reference dependent, meaning that the person does not derive utility
from consumption ct , but from gains and losses compared to a reference point r > 0.5
Consumption ct ≥ r entails a gain. Lower consumption is considered a loss. Let μ(x)
be the utility from a gain or loss, x = c − r . A reference-dependent person optimizes
lifetime utility U (c1;w, r):
max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w, r) = max
c1≤w1
μ (c1 − r) + μ (w1 + w2 − c1 − r) (1)
cD1 (w, r) = arg maxc1≤w1 U (c1;w, r)
where cD1 (w, r) represents optimal consumption given incomew and a reference point
r , andgain–loss utilityμ(x) is the standardvalue functionoftenused in prospect theory.
Figure 1 draws an example. Gain–loss utility is defined for all x > −r , continuous
for all x , twice differentiable for all x = 0, and μ(0) is normalized to zero, μ(0) = 0.
In addition, drawing on Bowman et al. (1999), I assume that it satisfies the following
properties:
(A1) Monotonicity μ(x) is strictly increasing
(A2) Loss aversion over small stakes limx↓0 μ′(−x)/μ′(x) ≡ λ > 1
(A3) Diminishing sensitivity μ′′(x) < 0 < μ′′(−x) for all x > 0
(A4) Loss aversion over large stakes μ′(−r) > μ′(0+)
Assumption (A1) says that increasing a gain (or reducing a loss) increases well-
being and reducing a gain (increasing a loss) reduces well-being.
Assumption (A2) implies loss aversion over small stakes, meaning that a small
loss is more painful than a small gain is pleasant. By loss aversion, gain–loss utility
exhibits a kink at the reference point, explaining for instance why people prefer a
lottery with an even chance of earning $0 or $50 above a safe option yielding $20 with
certainty, while also preferring a safe option yielding $0 with certainty above a lottery
3 Low-income populations face several barriers to obtain higher returns on their savings, including high
inflation rates, informal taxation, limited access to banks, and asset risk of assets with higher returns.
4 A more nuanced model for financial market imperfections would assume endogenous credit rationing,
but to stay close to the literature, I follow seminal buffer-stock savings models that have modeled financial
market imperfections as an exogenous borrowing constraint (e.g., Deaton 1991; Carroll 1997).
5 The reference point is time invariant. If the reference point increases over time, future marginal utility
will be relatively high, increasing reference-dependent savings, but independent of the existence of liquidity
constraints. This section discusses when reference dependence may increase liquidity-constrained savings
if it unambiguously reduces unconstrained savings, but Sects. 3 and 4 discuss how liquidity constraints
create time variance.
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Fig. 1 Gain–loss utility satisfying loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity
in which they either lose $20 or gain $30. The two choices are identical in terms of
final outcomes, but the second choice frames the worst outcome as a loss, inducing a
preference for the safer option.
Assumption (A3) implies diminishing sensitivity, meaning that an additional gain
is less pleasant as more has already been gained, and an additional loss hurts less as
more is lost. Intuitively, under diminishing sensitivity, people can be risk averse when
choosing between a safe option yielding $25 with certainty and a lottery with an even
chance of winning either $0 or $50, but become risk-seeking when choosing between
a certain loss of $25 and a gamble with an even chance of losing either $50 or $0. This
reflection effect requires the marginal value of gains and losses to decrease in size.
In other words, gain–loss utility is convex–concave around the reference point, as in
Fig. 1.
Assumption (A3) by itself could imply that a person prefers increasing an already
big loss at the benefit of incurring a small gain. Because choice experiments do not
always find evidence of convex loss utility (e.g., Levy and Levy 2002) and some of
the evidence for convex loss utility results from non-incentivized decisions (Laury
and Holt 2008), I specify Assumption (A4), stating that a consumer prefers reducing a
loss—which is at most r—above increasing a gain—which is at least 0+. As a result,
loss aversion dominates behavior in trade-offs involving both gains and losses, while
the convexity of loss utility shapes behavior only in trade-offs involving a sure loss.6
On a final note, the model abstracts from discounting. This improves tractability
without major implications, but leaves a few cases in which the consumer is indifferent
6 Bowman et al. (1999) adopt a weaker assumption for loss aversion over large stakes, but (A4) comes
without toomuch loss of generality. Take for instance the value function estimated in Tversky andKahneman
(1992), i.e.,μ(x) = xθG for gains andμ(x) = −λ(−x)θL , with parameters λˆ = 2.25 and θˆL = θˆG = 0.88.
Marginal disutility of the largest loss exceeds marginal utility of the smallest gain if the reference point r
is at most 860 times the size of the minimum gain. This restricts r only weakly.
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between consuming either c1 = ω and c2 = ν, or c1 = ν and c2 = ω, wherebyω = ν.
Whenboth these solutions optimize utility, a person prefers the solution thatmaximizes
consumption in the first period, similar to a model in which period 2 consumption is
discounted by a factor β ∈ (0, 1):
If U (ω, ·) = U (ν, ·) = sup
c1
U (c1, ·) and ω > ν, then cD1 (·) = ω (2)
2.2 Solution of the model with an exogenous reference point
This section analyzes how the reference-dependent optimum and reference-
independent optimum differ in a context of missing credit markets. Figure 2 sum-
marizes optimal consumption in the present, c∗1, as a function of income on hand,
w1. The solid line indicates reference-dependent consumption. As a benchmark, the
dashed line indicates the reference-independent optimum, replacing μ(c − r) with a
strictly increasing concave utility function m(c).
When preferences are reference-independent (“I”), the sole savings motive is to
smooth consumption. Consumers prefer to smooth perfectly, c1 = c2. However, when
w1 < w2, this entails borrowing, which is not possible in the presence of a liquidity
constraint. By concavity, the feasible optimum is to consume income on hand, w1,
resulting in piecewise linear consumption:
cI1(w) = min{w¯, w1}, w¯ ≡ (w1 + w2)/2
Reference-dependent (“D”) savings depend on a person’s ability to eliminate losses.
When the reference point equals future income, r = w2, as in Panel (a) in Fig. 2,
consuming c1 ≤ w1 in the present and c2 ≥ w2 in the future is sufficient to avoid a
future loss. Substituting r = w2, Problem (1) reduces to
max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w, w2) = max
c1≤w1
μ(c1 − w2) + μ(w1 − c1),
where c1 − w2 entails a present gain or loss, and c2 − w2 = w1 − c1 ≥ 0 a future
gain. The solution only depends on income. When present income is relatively low,
w1 < w2, the liquidity constraint restricts c1 to a level below the reference point w2,
while c2 is at or above w2. The person is forced to take a present loss and a future
gain. Due to loss aversion, it is optimal to minimize the present loss and consume
present income, c1 = w1. When present income is relatively high, w1 ≥ w2, the
liquidity constraint does not bind. A loss-averse person avoids a loss in both periods,
c1 ∈ [w2, w1]. In this range, life-cycle utility is concave and it is optimal to smooth
gains, c1 = w¯, so that the reference-dependent optimum and reference-independent
optimum are observationally equivalent:
cD1 (w, w2) = min{w1, w¯} = cI1(w).
This result hinges upon future incomebeing equal to the reference point,w2 = r , ruling
out losses in the future period. In Panel (b), future income is lower, w2 = r − δ < r ,
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Fig. 2 Consumption and early income when the reference point is exogenous. a Future income equals the
reference point (w2 = r ). b Future income is below the reference point (w2 = r − δ)
and the consumer needs to save at least δ > 0 to avoid a future loss. Problem (1) can
now be written as:
max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w, w2 + δ) = max
c1≤w1
μ(c1 − w2 − δ) + μ(w1 − δ − c1).
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In this case, the solution depends on the gap between future income and the reference
point, δ. Panel (b) in Fig. 2 distinguishes four cases differing in whether a person
avoids present or future losses. When w1 < δ, the consumer cannot avoid a loss in
either period so that lifetime utility is convex. The optimum is a corner solution in
which the loss is concentrated in one period andminimized in the other period. In other
words, it is optimal to consume all wealth in one period and zero in the other, and as
the liquidity constraint prevents the person from consuming all wealth in the present,
it is optimal to take the full loss in the present, c1 = 0.7 Instead of interpreting this
as starvation, the model may apply to a context of narrow bracketing, with consumers
making reference-dependent decisions regarding more disposable income sources.
When w1 ∈ [δ, r), the person cannot avoid an early loss, since present income is still
below the reference point. However, she can now avoid a future loss by saving at least
δ. Due to loss aversion over large stakes, Assumption (A4), the person will not save
more than δ, as this would entail a future gain at the expense of a present loss. By
diminishing sensitivity, Assumption (A3), she will also not save less than δ, since it
is optimal to take the full loss in one period. As a result, the solution is to save δ in
order to eliminate the future loss and consume c1 = w1 − δ in the present period.
When present income is at least as high as the reference point, w1 ∈ [r, r + δ), it
is possible to eliminate either the present loss and consume c1 = r , or the future loss
and consume c1 = w1 − δ. Both options yield equal life-cycle utility and optimize
the objective function. By Condition (2), the consumer prefers the solution with the
highest level and consumption jumps from c1 = w1−δ to c1 = r .8 Thus, the liquidity
constraint no longer binds.
When present income is even higher and satisfies w1 − δ ≥ w2 + δ, it is possible to
avoid losses in both periods. By diminishing sensitivity, utility for gains is concave, and
the solution will satisfy a first-order condition such that the present gain, c1 −w2 − δ,
equals the future gain,w1−δ−c1. Thismeans that optimal consumption is equivalent to
the reference-independent solution, c1 = w¯.9 Summarizing, if future income is below
the reference point, reference-dependent consumption becomes:
cD1 (w, w2 + δ) =
{
max{0, w1 − δ} < cI1(w) ∀ w1 < w2 + δ
max{w2 + δ, w¯} ≥ cI1(w) ∀ w1 ≥ w2 + δ
Toconclude, reference dependence does not affect optimal savingswhen future income
is sufficiently high to avoid future losses, as in Panel (a). By contrast, when future
income is insufficient to avoid future losses, as in Panel (b), reference dependence
affects decisions differently depending on whether consumers face a binding liquidity
7 The other corner, c1 = w1, yields strictly lower utility than c1 = 0 for all 0 < w1 < δ:
U (0;w, w2 + δ) − U (w1;w, w2 + δ) = μ(−w2 − δ) + μ(w1 − δ) − [μ(w1 − w2 − δ) + μ(−δ)]
> 0 ⇔ w2 + w1 > w2 − w1, w1 < δ.
8 This jump could still occur in the presence of discounting, albeit at a lower income level.
9 Smoothing of gains means that the following first-order condition is satisfied: μ′(c1 − w2 − δ) =
μ′(w1−δ−c). Rearranging c1−w2−δ = w1−δ−c1 yields the result that smoothing gains is equivalent
to smoothing consumption, c1 = w¯.
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constraint. A person with relatively high income, w1 ∈ [r, r + δ), does not face a
binding liquidity constraint and can postpone taking the full loss to the future. Thus,
she saves less than reference-independent consumers. A person with low income on
hand, w1 < r , is forced to take part of the loss in the early period, so that it is
optimal to concentrate the loss in that period and savemore than reference-independent
consumers. In this way, liquidity constraints and reference dependence can interact ex
post after reference points have been formed.
2.3 Discussion of the model with exogenous reference points
The model with exogenous reference points illustrates an ex-post mechanism through
which a binding liquidity constraint affects reference-dependent savings. To interpret
this mechanism, it is important to specify how people form their reference point.
Previous literature on reference-dependent savings has hypothesized that the reference
point is determined by changes in wealth (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), by past
consumption levels that lead to habit formation (Bowman et al. 1999), by a comparison
with neighbors’ or the society’s consumption, creating a preference for “keeping up
with the Joneses,” or by rational expectations of consumption (Ko˝szegi and Rabin
2006).
The findings presented above can be interpreted in terms of each of these alternative
specifications. For instance, if reference points are shaped by average consumption in
the society, low income might induce a person to save in the early period in order
to catch up with others in the future. Alternatively, in the presence of habit for-
mation, someone may get used to a consumption level that is no longer affordable
given her present income. Diminishing sensitivity can motivate this person to reduce
present consumption below the reference point, and save to return to her habits in the
future. Finally, when expected consumption determines the reference point and present
income is lower than anticipated, a person may prefer to cut present consumption and
save enough to consume expected levels in the future.
It is nevertheless difficult to empirically test this framework. Without specifying
a unique reference point, the model can explain any consumption pattern simply by
adjusting the reference point to match observed behaviors. More sophisticated models
specify how the reference point is being formed, reducing the degrees of freedom.
Another weakness is that consumption levels do not matter at all in this framework.
It is plausible that consumers facing extreme losses do pay attention to consumption
levels, while consumers facing gains or moderate losses are concerned with changes
relative to reference levels. The remainder of this paper addresses these two issues.
3 Case II: Endogenous reference points and deterministic income
3.1 Model for intertemporal choice with expectations-based reference points
The last decade has seen substantial progress in modeling reference dependence, one
example being the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) framework for wealth and intertemporal
choice (henceforthKR). This framework builds on Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), a model
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for reference-dependent preferences that is labeled a “significant attempt to clarify
how people think about gains and losses, … both disciplined and portable across
different contexts” (Barberis 2013). KR specify expectations prior to consumption,
i.e., consumption plans, as the reference point, and model how consumers make these
plans. This yields a unique reference point, eliminating the degrees of freedom that
hampered applications of prospect theory outside the laboratory.
This section introduces a liquidity constraint in a deterministic application of the
KR framework with two periods. Consumers form beliefs regarding both present and
future consumption, assuming they have perfect foresight of income and consump-
tion, and derive gain–loss utility from comparing actual and planned consumption
paths. Specifically, the consumer believes her income will be w = (w1, w2). The
anticipated—or planned—consumption path given these income levels, defined as
b = (b1, b2), serves as a reference point for actual consumption, c = (c1, c2).
The theory makes three key assumptions. To start, not only gains and losses but
also consumption levels affect well-being, so that instantaneous utility in period t can
be written as follows:
u(ct ; bt , γt ) ≡ m(ct ) + γtμ (m(ct ) − m(bt )) . (3)
Instantaneous utility includes consumption utility m(c), which is increasing and
concave, and μ(x), a standard gain–loss utility function satisfying Assumptions
(A1)–(A4), with γt defined as the weight on period t gain–loss utility. Gain–loss
utility is derived from information or news regarding consumption, i.e., from changes
between actual and planned consumption utility, m(c) − m(b). Using a first-order
Taylor expansion, small gains and losses reduce to m′(b)(c − b) and m′(c)(b − c),
respectively. As a result, gains and losses can be interpreted in relative rather than
absolute terms. This is an important difference with the previous section.
A second assumption is that rational expectations (or, with deterministic income,
anticipated levels) of consumption serve as a reference point. More precise, twomech-
anisms jointly determine a consumption plan b: First, consumers only make plans
to which they can commit. In other words, given an income path and associated
consumption plan, actual consumption cD(w;b) satisfies an equilibrium condition
cD(w;b) = b. Plans satisfying these criteria are labeled a “personal equilibrium.”
Second, out of all personal equilibria, the consumer chooses the plan that optimizes
utility ex-ante. This so-called preferred personal equilibrium provides a unique refer-
ence point. “Appendix 1” discusses the formation of plans in more detail.
A final assumption is that news regarding present consumption resonates more
than news affecting future consumption. In other words, changing beliefs regarding
present consumption carries a higher weight than changing beliefs regarding future
consumption:
γ ≡ γ2/γ1 < 1
Normalizing theweight on present gains and losses to one, γ1 = 1, the weight attached
to prospective gains and losses becomes γ2 = γ .
Using these building blocks, a consumer solves the following problem:
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max
c1≤w1,c2
U (c;w,b) = max
c1≤w1,c2
u(c1; b1, γ1) + u(c2; b2, γ2), (4)
c2 = w1 + w2 − c1, b2 = w1 + w2 − b1, (5)
cD(w,b) = arg max
c1≤w1,c2
U (c;w,b), (6)
At t = 1, the consumer decides how much to consume in both periods, given her
income and the associated consumption plan. She optimizes the sum of instantaneous
utilities subject to a liquidity constraint, c1 ≤ w1, and a regular budget constraint,
c1 + c2 = w1 + w2.
I specify three additional conditions to pose more structure on instantaneous utility
u(ct ; bt , γt ):
(C1) Intertemporal loss aversion γ λ > 1
(C2) Declining diminishing sensitivity μ′′′(x)μ′(x) ≥ μ′′(x)2 for all x < 0
(C3) Strong decreasing absolute risk aversion A′(c) ≤ −A(c)2 < 0,A(c) ≡ −m′′(c)/m′(c).
Condition (C1) says that future losses carry a higher marginal utility weight than
present gains, γ λ > 1, where λ is the loss aversion parameter defined in Assumption
(A2). Such “intertemporal loss aversion”means that future losses aremore painful than
present gains are pleasant. “Appendix 1” shows that as a result of this condition, the
endogenous consumption plan, b, is equivalent to the reference-independent optimum:
cD(w, cI (w)) = cI (w) ⇔ γ λ > 1 (7)
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) derive a similar result for the case without liquidity con-
straints. In the absence of intertemporal loss aversion, γ λ < 1, someone planning to
smooth consumption has an incentive to surprise herself with an immediate gain at the
expense of a future loss. Without binding liquidity constraint, the endogenous plan is
hence to consumemore in the present than in the future. Condition (C1) allows analyz-
ing how a reference-dependent consumer who planned for the reference-independent
optimum responds to unanticipated income shocks.
Because instantaneous utility now includes concave consumption utility, it is not
strictly convex in losses c < b. Conditions (C2) and (C3) help ensure that instantaneous
utility is convex only for losses that are small relative to consumption. If gain–loss
utility was strictly concave, Condition (C2) would imply non-increasing absolute risk
aversion. For convex–concave utility, this condition means that the degree of dimin-
ishing sensitivity, |μ′′(x)|/μ′(x), does not increase in the size of a gain or loss |x |.
Condition (C3) means that the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for
consumption utility decreases at a relatively high rate compared to how risk averse the
consumer is. This requires decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) from relatively
low levels of absolute risk aversion.10
10 For instance, when consumption utility satisfies constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the degree of
absolute risk aversion is A(c) = ρ/c, where ρ > 0 is defined as the Arrow–Pratt CRRA coefficient.
Condition (C3) is satisfied when −ρ/c2 ≤ −ρ2/c2, that is, when ρ ≤ 1. In the more general case where
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As a result, when losses are small and consumption is high, diminishing sensitivity
of gain–loss utility is strong relative to the concavity of consumption utility, making
instantaneous utility convex. By contrast, when losses are large and consumption
is low, instantaneous utility will be concave. The following Lemma formalizes this
claim:
Lemma 1 Assume a loss L < 0 exists such that DS(L) = A(c)/m′(c), where
DS(x) ≡ γ |μ′′(x)|/(1 + γμ′(x)) and A(c) ≡ −m′′(c)/m′(c). If Conditions (C2)
and (C3) hold, then instantaneous utility is convex for all x ∈ (L , 0).
For a proof, see “Appendix 2.” Intuitively, instantaneous utility is convex when dimin-
ishing sensitivity, i.e., the preference to concentrate losses, dominates absolute risk
aversion, i.e., the preference to smooth consumption. This will be the case when losses
are sufficiently small, x ∈ (L , 0). If losses are more extreme, absolute risk aversion
A(c)will dominate the reduced degree of diminishing sensitivity DS(x), yielding con-
cave instantaneous utility. As a result, binging consumption into one period is never
optimal.
As an example, consider the case with log consumption utility, m(c) = log(c), so
that we can interpret small gains and losses as the relative change in consumption, with
m(c) − m(b) ≈ (c − b)/b for a gain c > b, and m(b) − m(c) ≈ (b − c)/c for a loss
c < b. Further, consider the commonly used gain–loss utility function μ(x) = ηxθ
for x ≥ 0 and μ(x) = −ηλ(−x)θ for x < 0, where η is the weight of gain–loss
utility relative to consumption utility. With parameters η = 10, γ = 1, θ = 0.88,
and λ = 2.25 (the latter two based on estimates from Tversky and Kahneman 1992),
utility is convex for all losses such that the planned level is at most 11.5% above actual
consumption, −x < L ≈ 0.115.
Alternatively, consider exponential gain–loss utility, μ(x) = η(1 − e−θx )/θ for
x ≥ 0 and μ(x) = −ηλ(1 − eθx )/θ for x < 0. For this specific example, the
maximum loss at which utility is convex has an explicit expression:11
L = − log (η(θ − 1)γ λ) /θ
With parameters η = 10, γ = 1, θ = 1.05, and λ = 2.25, utility is convex for
all losses such that the planned level is at most 11.2% above actual consumption,
−x < L ≈ 0.112. Thus, at reasonable parameter values, instantaneous utility is
convex for a substantial range of losses.
Footnote 10 continued
the inverse of absolute risk aversion is a linear function of consumption, A(c) = 1/(ac+ b), this condition
is satisfied if and only if a ≥ 1.
11 Using Lemma 1, and log utility’s property that −m′′(c) = m′(c)2, so that A(c)/m′(c) = 1, we obtain
this explicit expression for L as follows:
DS(L) = 1 ⇔ γ ηλθeθL = 1 + γ ηλeθL ⇔ γ ηλeθL (θ − 1) = 1.
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3.2 Response to unanticipated income shocks
This section analyzes how within this framework exogenous income shocks affect
intertemporal choice. By Condition (C1), intertemporal loss aversion is satisfied, and
planned consumption equals the reference-independent optimum. Shocks induce con-
sumers to revise their plan. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) show that they do so in an
asymmetric way. Consumers facing income losses prefer not to cut present spending
but spend income gains immediately. This reduces savings compared to the reference-
independent optimum. However, KR do not consider the existence of a liquidity
constraint in their analyses.
To analyze how a liquidity constraint can influence the response to unanticipated
income shocks, consider a consumer who plans to earn w = (w1, w2) but learns
that her earnings will be w′ = (w′1, w2), with w′1 = w1. The reference-independent
optimum is to smooth consumption unless the liquidity constraint is binding,w′1 < w2,
preventing perfect smoothing. In that case, the feasible optimum is w′1. Thus,
cI1(w
′) = min{w′1, w¯′}, w¯′ = (w′1 + w2)/2
By contrast, the reference-dependent optimum depends on the prior consumption
plan, which is the reference-independent optimum given the anticipated income path,
cI (w), under Condition (C1). The revised plan does not need to satisfy the personal
equilibrium conditions and solves:
max
c1≤w′1
U (c1;w′, cI (w)) = max
c1≤w′1
u(c1; cI1(w), γ1) + u(2w¯′ − c1; cI2(w), γ2) (8)
cD1 (w
′, cI (w)) = arg max
c1≤w′1
U (c1;w′,w) (9)
Figure 3presents the solution to this problem, illustrating revised consumption in the
first period as a function of actual incomeonhand. Thefigure distinguishes between the
reference-independent case—the solid line—and the reference-dependent case, with
varying weights attached to prospective gain–loss utility—the dashed and dotted lines.
The figure distinguishes twomechanisms throughwhich reference dependencemay
increase savings under liquidity constraints. Panel (a) presents the first mechanism,
which occurs due to an ex-post effect of liquidity constraints. Here, consumers antici-
pate higher income in the first period than in the second period, w1 > w2, and plan to
consume cI (w) = (w¯, w¯) ≡ w¯. For income gains and relatively small losses,w′1 ≥ w¯,
consumption responds asymmetrically to shocks. This is similar to the asymmetry KR
obtained in the case without liquidity constraints: consumers do not cut spendingwhen
facing small income losses, but they spend windfall gains immediately. This increases
consumption (and reduces savings) compared to the reference-independent optimum.
Moreover, if the revised level of income on hand is very small, w′1 ≤ w, marginal
consumption utility in the first period, m′(c1) ≥ m′(w′1), will be large enough for
life-cycle utility to be increasing in c1. In that case, it is optimal to spend income on
hand as in the reference-independent case.
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Reference-dependent, γ = 0.6
Reference-dependent, γ = 0.9
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 Consumption and early income after surprise income shocks. a Income believed to be relatively high
in the early period:w1 > w2.b Income believed to be relatively low in the early period:w1 < w2. The figure
draws the solution to Problem (8)–(9) using μ(x) = ηxθ for utility from gains, x ≥ 0; μ(x) = −ηλ(−x)θ
for gain–loss utility from losses, x < 0; with x = m(c)−m(b),m(c) = log(c) andm(b) = log(b). Income
is w1 = 52 and w2 = 48 in a, and w1 = 48 and w2 = 52 in b. Parameter values are η = 10, λ = 2.25,
and θ = 0.88
However, for moderately sized income losses, w′1 ∈ (w, w¯), the optimal response
depends on the weight attached to future gains and losses. Consumers need to take
a loss in at least one period. By Lemma 1, instantaneous utility is convex if losses
are not too large, −x > L . It is then optimal to concentrate losses in one period.
The liquidity constraint prevents consumers from taking the full loss in the future
period. Instead, if prospective gains and losses carry a sufficiently high weight, it is
optimal to take the full loss in the early period and save the amount they planned to set
aside for future consumption. The dotted line is therefore strictly below the reference-
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γ = 0.9
γ = 0.6
U(c;w ,w¯ , γ)
c146 5048
Fig. 4 Life-cycle utility and early income after a surprise income loss. Anticipated and actual income paths
are w = (52, 48) and w′ = (48, 48), respectively. Gain–loss utility satisfies μ(x) = ηxθ for all x ≥ 0
and μ(x) = −ηλ(−x)θ for all x < 0, with η = 10, λ = 2.25, θ = 0.88, and x = m(c) − m(b) where
m(c) = log(c) and m(b) = log(b)
independent optimum for all w′1 ∈ (w, w¯). By contrast, when a lower weight is
attached to future losses, as is true for the dashed line, it is optimal to minimize the
early loss by consuming income on hand.
As an example of this ex-postmechanism,Fig. 4 plots lifetimeutility if the consumer
plans to earn w = (52, 48) but learns that she earns w′1 = 48 rather than w1 = 52.
The figure distinguishes again between a high weight and a low weight of prospective
gain–loss utility, γ = 0.9 and γ = 0.6, respectively.12 A person receiving bad news
regarding present income has to give up her plan of consuming w¯ = 50 in both
periods. Since γ < 1, it is optimal to delay the loss and consume c = (50, 46).
But this entails borrowing, which is not feasible. Because utility is convex for a sure
loss, c1 ∈ (46, 50), the consumer prefers concentrating the loss in one period if γ is
sufficiently high, as is the case on the solid line, with γ = 0.9. In that case, she takes
the full loss immediately, c′1 = 46, and saves enough to consume c′2 = w¯ = 50 in the
second period. In other words, the aspiration to carry through future plans enhances
savings for the liquidity-constrained consumer.
Panel (b) in Fig. 3 presents a second mechanism through which reference depen-
dence can increase savings in the presence of an ex-ante liquidity constraint. It draws
the optimal revision for consumers who anticipate lower income in the first period than
in the second period,w1 < w2. They plan to consume cD(w, cI (w)) = w. The dashed
line is associated with a relatively low weight attached to future gains and losses. As
in Panel (a), the liquidity constraint binds and the optimal revision is to take losses and
modest income gains immediately, resulting in hand-to-mouth consumption, c1 = w′1,
even when gains are large enough to raise first-period income above second-period
income, w′1 > w2. Only when the gain is very large, the consumer saves some of the
windfall for future periods. As a result, reference-dependent consumption is strictly
larger than reference-independent consumption for all w′1 > w2.
12 Consumption levels c1 > 46 are associated with bad news regarding future periods. Since the relative
disutility from such news is minimized when consumers do not attach much weight to prospective gains
and losses, lifetime utility is higher when γ = 0.6 than when γ = 0.9.
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This is not the case for the dotted line, with a relatively high weight attached to
prospective gains and losses. If γ is high, the income level above which it is optimal
to spread the gain over time is lower than it is for reference-independent consumers.
Intuitively, because lower consumption was planned for the first period than for the
second period, the reference level for first-period consumption is lower as well. It is
therefore optimal to save when facing a small windfall, even when the first period
is associated with lower consumption than the second period. For larger windfalls,
gains are large enough to render differences in gain–loss utility from the two periods
negligible. In that case, since γ < 1 and gains in the first period have a higher
weight than gains in the first period, consumers save less than reference-independent
consumers.
The next two propositions formalize these results (see “Appendix 2” for a proof).
The first proposition considers a person who anticipates present income to be higher
than future income, w1 > w2. As illustrated in Panel (a) in Fig. 3, if she faces a
moderate income loss,w′1 ∈ (w, w¯), she may save the amount she anticipated to save,
increasing savings compared to the reference-independent case:
Proposition 1 Assume that a loss L < 0 exists such that DS(L) = A(c)/m′(c).
Suppose anticipated income in the present period was w1 ∈ (w2, φw2), with φ > 1
implicitly defined as m′((3 − φ)w2/2)(φ − 1)w2 = −L, but that actual income is
w′1 = w1. Income levels w < w2 and w¯ = (w1 + w2)/2 > w2 exist such that the
revised plan cD(w′, w¯) solving Problem (8)–(9) satisfies:
cD1 (w
′, w¯)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= cI1(w′) ∀ w′1 ≤ w
< cI1(w
′) ∀ w′1 ∈ (w, w¯)
> cI1(w
′) ∀ w′1 ≥ w¯
This proposition only applies when lifetime utility is convex. This requires a suf-
ficiently high weight, γ , attached to prospective gains and losses. Furthermore, the
anticipated gap between first- and second-period income should not be too large,
w1 ≤ φw2. In the example with log consumption utility, φ can be expressed explicitly
as φ = (2−3L)/(2− L) > 1 for all L < 0. If in addition the maximum loss at which
utility is convex is 11%, as in earlier examples, first-period income can be up to 10%
above second-period income.
The second proposition considers a person who anticipates present income to be
lower than future income, w1 < w2, and hence plans to consume less in the present.
As illustrated in Panel (b) in Fig. 3, if the weight attached to prospective gain–loss
utility is sufficiently large, this person prefers to spread income gains over the two
periods and save. She will do so at income levels for which reference-independent
consumers prefer to live hand-to-mouth, again increasing savings compared to the
reference-independent case:
Proposition 2 Suppose that anticipated income in the present period was w1 < w2,
but that actual income isw′1 = w1. If γ > μ′(m′(w1)(w2−w1))/μ′(0+), then income
levels {w∗, w∗∗} satisfying w1 < w∗ < w2 < w∗∗ exist such that the revised plan
cD(w′,w) solving Problem (8)–(9) satisfies:
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cD1 (w
′,w)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= cI1(w′) ∀ w′1 ≤ w∗
< cI1(w
′) ∀ w′1 ∈ (w∗, w∗∗)
> cI1(w
′) ∀ w′1 > w∗∗
In the tractable example with log consumption utility, m(c) = log(c), and expo-
nential gain–loss utility, μ(x) = η(1 − e−θx )/θ for all x ≥ 0, the condition
γ > μ′(m′(w1)(w2−w1))/μ′(0+) includesμ′(0+) = η andμ′(x) = ηe−θ(w2−w1)/w1
as the marginal gain–loss utility terms. The condition hence reduces to
w1 < w1 (1 − log γ /θ) < w2.
When w2 is sufficiently far above w1 so that w2 − w1 > − log γ /θ , reference
dependence increases savings for all w′1 ∈ (w∗, w∗∗). Intuitively, when a consumer
anticipated a binding liquidity constraint, but unexpectedly earns more than antici-
pated and is no longer constrained, she will smooth the gain over time. This makes
consumption react gradually in response to unanticipated income shocks.
The results in this section require diminishing sensitivity. The next section relaxes
this assumption, replicating the ex-ante mechanism behind Proposition 2 when gain–
loss utility is piecewise linear rather than convex–concave.
4 Case III: Endogenous reference points and stochastic income
4.1 Expectations-based reference points when consumption is stochastic
Thus far, consumers did not anticipate the possibility of an income shockwhenmaking
their plans. This might be somewhat disputable, in part because borrowing restrictions
will apply in particular for people with volatile incomes, as banks may fear more
defaults among this group. Here, I therefore analyze optimal savings when loss-averse
consumers anticipate income risk. Specifically, when making their plans, consumers
do not know how much they will earn in the two periods. They find out just prior to
the actual consumption-saving decision. Thus, risk present in the planning stage has
resolved at the time of actual consumption, eliminating self-insurance motives to save.
For reference-independent consumers, this means that the optimum is equivalent
to the reference-independent optimum in previous sections. Their sole savings motive
is to spread consumption over time. Assuming perfect financial markets, KR show
that loss-averse consumers save less than the reference-independent optimum, since
news about immediate consumption carries a higher utility weight. Incorporating liq-
uidity constraints, this section predicts the opposite: Loss-averse consumers may save
more than reference-independent consumers because anticipating a liquidity constraint
increases expected consumption—andhence the reference point—for future compared
to early periods.
Henceforth, consumers’ disposable income in period t ∈ {1, 2}, Wt , is IID with
a cumulative distribution F(·) and density f (·). Upper cases refer to the stochastic
variable before the realization of the risk, and lower cases refer to realized values.
Income is stochastic due to temporary price shocks, unpredictable expenditures, or
123
When expectations become aspirations… 703
income shocks, and these shocks do not affect the marginal productivity of capital.
Both buffer-stock models and the KR framework model risk in this way. To stay close
to this literature, I do not analyze other types of risk like asset or capital income risk.
The consumer plans without perfect foresight of income during an initial period
t = 0. At that stage, she only knows the income distribution in periods t ∈ {1, 2}.
Let W = (W1,W2) represent income before the realization of risk. The consumption
plan made at t = 0 is represented by a distribution of beliefs, B(·) = (B1(·), B2(·)),
i.e., a contingency plan in which B1(w) ≤ w1 and B2(w) = w1 + w2 − B(·) are
defined as the planned consumption level in the first and second period given realized
incomes w = (w1, w2). To isolate the effect of risk at the planning stage, the income
risk regarding both periods is resolved prior to consumption at t = 1, meaning that
there are no precautionary savings in both the reference-dependent and reference-
independent cases. The next section discusses the implications of this assumption in
more detail.
Once the consumer knows how much she will earn in both periods, she decides to
consume c1 ≤ w1 in the first period, save w1 − c1 in a risk-free asset with zero returns
for the second period, and consume c2 = w1+w2−c1 in the second period. Comparing
first-period consumption c1 with the contingency plan B1(·) yields contemporaneous
gain–loss utility. Comparing second-period consumption c2 with the contingency plan
for future consumption, B2(·), yields prospective gain–loss utility. There will be no
updating of beliefs and hence no gain–loss utility, in the final period, t = 2.
I abstract from diminishing sensitivity because it improves tractability and because
the literature is inconclusive as to whether loss utility is convex. Instead, gain–loss
utility is piecewise linear, μ(x) = ηx for x ≥ 0 and μ(x) = ηλx for x < 0, where
η represents the weight attached to gain–loss utility and λ > 1 the degree of loss
aversion. Assuming that the integral below exists, gain–loss utility from changing a
plan is defined as:
N (c; B(·)) =
∫
μ(m(c) − m(B(W )))dF(W ) (10)
To illustrate this definition of gain–loss utility, consider a consumer who expects to
consume either 50 or 100, both with probability 1/2. The gain or loss from comparing
these two outcomes is m(100) − m(50) ≡ M . If she learns in period 1 that she will
consume 50, she experiences a loss relative to the good outcome of consuming 100,
which would have occurred with probability 1/2, yielding loss utility −1/2ηλM . If
instead she learns that consumption will be 100, she experiences a gain relative to the
worst-case scenario of consuming 50, which would have occurred with probability
1/2, yielding gain utility 1/2ηM . Hence, the probability that a gain or loss occurs
determines its decision weight.13
13 Gain–loss utility could always include a probability weight π(p). Probability weighting is a core fea-
ture of rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). If people
overweight the probability that negative events occur, theymay becomemore risk averse,while if they under-
weight this probability, they may becomemore risk-seeking. Probability weighting may therefore confound
the effects of loss aversion. Therefore, I study the effect of reference dependence, and in particular loss
aversion, in isolation of probability weighting.
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Regarding the formation of plans, consider two types of consumers. The first
is a “naive” consumer planning for the reference-independent optimum, cI1(w) =
min{w1, w¯}, where w¯ is average income from the two periods. For this consumer,
optimal consumption is defined by the following problem:
max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w, cI (·)) = max
c1≤w1
m(c1) + N (c1; cI (·)) + γ N (w1 + w2 − c1; cI2(·))
+ m(w1 + w2 − c1)
cD1 (w, c
I (·)) ≡ arg max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w, cI (·))
For a naive consumer, the optimum cD(w, cI (·)) is not necessarily equivalent to the
planned level of consumption, cI (w). The second type therefore concerns a more
“sophisticated” consumerwhoonlymakes plans that she is committed to carry through.
For her, consumption solves the following problem:
max
c1≤w1
U (c1;w,B(·)) = max
c1≤w1
m(c1) + N (c1; B1(·)) + γ N (w1 + w2 − c1; B2(·))
+ m(w1 + w2 − c1)
cD1 (w,B(·)) ≡ arg maxc1≤w1 U (c1;w,B(·)) = B1(w) ∀ w ∈ W
A sophisticated consumer optimizes U (c1;w,B(·)), lifetime utility given the contin-
gency plan to consume B(·), and this optimum does not deviate from that contingency
plan given realized incomew.KR use this latter condition to define a personal equilib-
rium (see “Appendix 1” and Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006 for a more detailed discussion
of this equilibrium concept).
Finally, this section replaces Conditions (C1)–(C3) by two new conditions:
(C1)’ Intertemporal loss aversion
γ > (λ − (λ − 1)P1(w¯))/(λ − (λ − 1)P2(w¯))
(C2)’ Non-increasing absolute risk aversion
A′(c) ≤ 0, with A(c) ≡ −m′′(c)/m′(c)
The first condition generalizes intertemporal loss aversion by placing a lower bound
on γ , the weight attached to prospective gains and losses. In this condition, λ > 1 is
the degree of loss aversion; w¯ = (w1 + w2)/2 the reference-independent optimum
for w1 > w2; and P1(w¯) and P2(w¯) the probabilities of consuming less than w¯ in the
first and second periods, respectively, given the plan to consume cI1 = min{w1, w¯}.
Because the consumer is liquidity-constrained, she expects to consume less than w¯
with a higher probability in the first period, P1(w¯) > P2(w¯). As a result, the lower
bound for γ is strictly below one.14 This also implies that the lower bound for γ
decreases as the degree of loss aversion, λ, increases.
14 Notice that P1(w¯) ≡ P(W < w¯) + P(W ≥ w¯)P(W¯ < w¯|W ≥ w¯), i.e., the probability that income
in the first period is lower than w¯, or if first-period income is higher, the probability that average income
W¯ = (W1 + W2)/2 is lower than w¯ (we can drop time subscripts for income because the income process
is assumed to be IID). Further, define P2(w¯) ≡ P(W < w¯)P(W¯ < w¯|W ≥ w¯) as the probability that both
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The second condition says that consumption utility exhibits non-increasing absolute
risk aversion, including both constant and decreasing absolute risk aversion. This
condition is less restrictive than its analog in the previous section, Condition (C3),
imposing strong decreasing absolute risk aversion, A′(c) ≤ −A(c)2.15
4.2 Implications of liquidity constraints for stochastic reference points
This section compares reference-dependent and reference-independent consumption
plans. Since the risk is resolved prior to the consumption-saving decision, it does not
affect the reference-independent optimum. Without liquidity constraints, a reference-
independent consumer prefers perfect smoothing, cI (w) = w¯, and KR show that
reference dependence leads to higher consumption in early periods. Given the plan to
consume w¯ for all w ∈ W, marginal lifetime utility evaluated at c = w¯ is:
m′(w¯) + N ′(w¯; cI1(·)) − m′(w¯) − γ N ′(w¯; cI2(·)) = N ′(w¯; cI1(·))(1 − γ )
> 0 ∀ γ < 1,
where we combine the gain–loss utilities from both periods since cI2(·) = cI1(·).
Thus, when consumers are able to borrow and attach more weight to changes in plans
regarding immediate consumption, they have an incentive to increase c1 above the
planned level w¯. Without liquidity constraint, naive consumers hence overconsume
relative to the reference-independent case.
A sophisticated consumer anticipates her incentive to overconsume in the first
period and plans for higher consumption, because she will only make plans that she is
committed to carry through. Assuming like KR that plans regarding both first-period
and second-period consumption, B1(w) and B2(w), are strictly increasing in total
income, the solution is characterized by the following set of first-order conditions:
m′(B1(w)) + N ′(B1(w); B1(·)) = m′(B2(w)) + γ N ′(B2(w); B2(·))
Because γ < 1, it is optimal to consume more in period 1 than in period 2. Thus,
without liquidity constraints, also sophisticated reference-dependent consumers will
save less than reference-independent consumers.
This result changes when introducing a liquidity constraint. Figure 5 draws optimal
consumption in the first period as a function of realized income in the first period,
assuming log consumption utility, uniformly distributed income Wt ∼ U [25, 75] for
t ∈ {1, 2} and realized income for the second period is w2 = 50. The figure draws
Footnote 14 continued
income in the second period and average income are lower than w¯. As a result,
P1(w¯) − P2(w¯) = P(W < w¯)(1 − P(W¯ < w¯|W < w¯)) + P(W ≥ w¯)P(W¯ < w¯|W ≥ w¯) > 0.
15 Condition (C2) is not applicable in this section because gain–loss utility is piecewise linear. As a
result, lifetime utility is strictly concave and there are no cases where diminishing sensitivity toward losses
dominates the concavity of consumption utility.
123
706 B. Kramer
Fig. 5 Consumption and early income when income risk is anticipated. a Relatively lowweight attached to
prospective gains and losses, γ = 0.65. b Relatively high weight attached to prospective gains and losses,
γ = 0.95. Income in period t follows a uniform distribution in the interval Wt ∈ [25, 75]. Future income
is w2 = 50, and utility is defined as μ(x) = ηx for x > 0 and μ(x) = −ηλx with η = 10 and λ = 2.25
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the reference-independent optimum (the solid line), the naive reference-dependent
optimum (the dashed line), and the sophisticated optimum (the dotted line). Panel (a)
attaches a relatively low weight to future gain–loss utility, violating Condition (C1)’,
whereas this weight is relatively high in Panel (b), so that Condition (C1)’ is satisfied.
In both panels, the reference-independent optimum is to consume cI1(w) =
min{w1, w¯}. At low levels of early income, the reference-dependent optimum is
equivalent as both types consume their income w1. At higher levels of early income,
reference-dependent consumption is either higher or lower, depending on the weight
attached to future gains and losses. In Panel (a), γ is relatively low, and reference
dependence increases consumption, reducing optimal savings. In Panel (b), γ is rel-
atively high, and reference dependence reduces optimal consumption, increasing the
optimal level of savings.
Intuitively, in the presence of a liquidity constraint ex ante, a consumer anticipates
income realizations for which she cannot smooth consumption since the liquidity
constraint will bind. For these income realizations, consumption is higher in the sec-
ond period than in the first period, raising the expected level of future consumption.
This increases consumers’ marginal gain–loss utility for the future period, creating
an incentive to consume less in the first period and save more for future consumption
if the weight attached to future gain–loss utility, γ , is sufficiently high. Differences
are more pronounced for sophisticated compared to naive consumers, because they
anticipate the deviation from the reference-independent optimum, influencing their
expectations and hence optimal consumption. The final proposition generalizes this
result to a continuous IID distribution.
Proposition 3 Suppose that income W is continuous and IID and that a consumer
learns at t = 1 she will earn w. Income levels wN < w2 and wS < wN exist such
that optimal consumption satisfies
cI1(w) ≥ cD1 (w, cI1(·)) ≥ cD1 (w, B1(·)),
with a strict first inequality for all w1 > wN and a strict second inequality for all
w1 > wS. Further, ∂cD1 (w, c
I
1(·))/∂wt ≤ 1/2 for all w1 ≥ wN , ∂cD1 (w, B(·))/∂wt ≤
1/2 for all w1 ≥ wS, and ∂cD1 (·)/∂wt < 1/2 ⇔ A′(c) < 0.
The proposition sheds light on the joint dynamic behavior of income and consumption.
When first-period income is sufficiently high, e.g., w1 ≥ wS for the sophisticated
consumer type, the marginal propensity to consume in the first period is at most half.
Thus, for all w1 ∈ (wS, w¯), they save at least half of their income, while the liquidity
constraint binds for reference-independent consumers. When absolute risk aversion is
decreasing, the marginal propensity to consume in the first period is strictly less than
half also for all w1 ≥ w¯, income levels at which reference-independent consumers
save half their income. Given that income realizes just prior to the first period, income
shocks are unanticipated, and consumption appears excessively smooth to such shocks.
At the same time, the lowmarginal propensity to consume in the first period together
with the budget constraint implies a highmarginal propensity to consume in the second
period, i.e., cD2 (w, c
I
2(·))/∂wt ≥ 1/2 for all w1 > wN , and ∂cD2 (w, B(·))/∂wt ≥ 1/2
for all w1 > wS . Given that consumers learn about the level of income shocks already
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in the first period, income shocks have been anticipated by the time of second-period
consumption. Thus, consumption appears excessively sensitive to anticipated income
shocks.
5 Discussion
This section reflects on the empirical evidence supporting the KR model, limitations
of the applications used, and the economic implications of the analyses presented in
the previous two sections.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2009) address some of the key challenges associated
with earlier models of reference dependence, and to my best knowledge, it is the most
advanced theory of reference dependence in intertemporal choice. Its key features have
been supported by recent experimental and observational studies. To start, reference-
independent preferences are nestedwithin thismodel, which has two benefits (Barberis
2013). First, it is unlikely that absolute levels of consumption do not matter at all with
all consumption being concentrated in one period. Second, the nested model allows
analyzingwhether the additional parameters embedded in reference-dependentmodels
are necessary to describe consumption. Ultimately, the question is not whether we
should replace consumption utility by gain–loss utility, but whether adding gain–loss
utility significantly improves behavioral predictions.
Further, in KR, beliefs shape the reference point. This unifies stylized facts from
laboratory experiments on information preferences, effort provision, and trading
decisions. In terms of information preferences, participants bet significantly less in
treatments with higher feedback frequency (Gneezy and Potters 1997; Haigh and List
2005; Bellemare et al. 2005), and investors monitor their portfolios more frequently in
rising markets than when markets are flat or falling (Karlsson et al. 2009). Regarding
effort provision, Abeler et al. (2011) find that manipulating rational expectations of
earnings influences effort.16 Ericson and Fuster (2011) show that the probability of
being allowed to trade or obtain an item affects the valuation of that item, suggesting
that beliefs held before the trade drive participants’ decisions. Given this interpreta-
tion, changes in wealth affect well-being by creating news about consumption, and
expectations are adjusted as soon as the news arrives. In line with this idea, Bronchetti
et al. (2013) argue that tax filers rejecting a default savings plan for their income tax
refund did so because they already anticipated the refund.
Finally, deriving utility from a comparison of actual and planned consumption can
explain why people prefer receiving the same piece of good information sooner rather
than later. Combinedwith loss aversion, this also explains an asymmetry in how people
respond to good versus bad income news. Shea (1995) and Bowman et al. (1999) find
that union workers receiving bad news regarding future income take the full loss in
the future and do not reduce present consumption, while those receiving positive news
take the full gain immediately and leave future consumption unaffected.
16 Crawford and Meng (2011) use this theory to explain negative wage elasticities in New York City taxi
drivers’ labor supply.
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Nevertheless, the paper made a number of simplifying assumptions to maintain
tractability. To start, each model included only two periods, covering the main dynam-
ics of the model. A longer time horizon exponentially increases the dimension of
the problem with endogenous reference points and does not substantially affect the
results. Consider for instance the model in Sect. 4 in which a naive person plans to
consume the reference-independent optimum.17 Independent of the number of peri-
ods, consumption in future periods will be higher than consumption in early periods
when the consumer has less flexibility to prepare for bad income draws. This increases
the reference point for future consumption, leading to higher savings in comparison
with the reference-independent case.
Another potential limitation is that the model abstracts from precautionary savings
motives. In Sect. 4, consumers anticipate risk, but future income risk is resolved already
in the early period, before consumers decide how much to save. Thus, the section
analyzes whether loss aversion and liquidity constraints create savingsmotives beyond
self-insurance against bad future income draws. I show that even in the absence of
such precautionary savings motives, reference-dependent consumers save more than
reference-independent consumers, not to self-insure, but because they expect higher
consumption in the future, increasing the reference point for future relative to early
periods.
Earlier studies have analyzed the impact of reference dependence on precau-
tionary savings. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), for instance, show that precautionary
savings motives are likely to be stronger for loss-averse consumers than for reference-
independent consumers. In the reference-independent case, future income risk
combined with liquidity constraints gives rise to precautionary savings motives only
if marginal utility is convex, i.e., if consumers are prudent (Deaton 1991; Carroll
1997).18 Precautionary motives driven by loss aversion and liquidity constraints are
first order and do not rely on the curvature of marginal utility, likely increasing
reference-dependent savings compared to the reference-independent case. Thus, future
income risk will not affect my results.
Further, both the ex-post and ex-ante effects of a binding liquidity constraint will
exist in the presence of precautionary savings. When individuals could perfectly self-
insure, the liquidity constraint would never bind in a dynamic model, but a large
number of studies show that informal insurance is far from perfect and that liquidity
constraints often bind (Cochrane 1991; Townsend 1994; Dercon 2008). A consumer
with convex loss utility depleting her buffer stock will still have an ex-post incentive to
take losses immediately rather than taking both an immediate and a future loss. Further,
ex-ante, loss-averse consumerswho anticipate having to save and replenish their buffer
in early periods expect lower consumption in the short run. Having anticipated this,
lower consumption in early periods will not be as painful, further increasing their
willingness to save. Reference dependence can hence increase liquidity-constrained
savings also when consumers accumulate buffer stocks.
17 A question is whether individuals are able to solve the problem with endogenous reference points as the
time horizon expands. As such, this naive reference point may actually reflect the decision-making process
more realistically.
18 In addition, asset or capital income risk should not dominate the exogenous income risk (Gunning 2010).
123
710 B. Kramer
As a final limitation, this paper imposed intertemporal loss aversion. This con-
dition helps ensure observational equivalence of reference-dependent and reference-
independent consumption plans in the absence of risk and income shocks. Intertem-
poral loss aversion requires prospective gains and losses to carry a sufficiently high
utility weight. At this stage, it is unclear howmuch attention consumers in low-income
settings pay to future gains and losses while making their financial decisions. A direc-
tion for future research is to empirically test the propositions in this paper and measure
to what extent financial decisions are characterized by intertemporal loss aversion.
Despite these limitations, predictions are consistent with savings patterns observed
in low-income settings. Although formal savings among the poor are low, a series
of financial diaries generating detailed data regarding the poor’s cash flows reveal
heterogeneity in informal savings rates, with a substantial share of households saving
even in times of financial hardship (Collins et al. 2009). Diaries further show that the
poor do save not only to self-insure against future shocks, but also for predictable
expenditures, even when facing shocks. This can take extreme forms. Dercon (2008,
p. ii122–ii123) notes the following: “It is well recorded that during crises, such as
the 1984–5 famine in Ethiopia, farmers desperately held on to their livestock, rather
than selling in time, even at the expense of many of their household members and their
own life.” The possibility of minimizing losses in the future, however remote, may
have induced them to keep saving their livestock. A preference for self-insurance and
consumption smoothing alone cannot explain such patterns, and other mechanisms—
potentially the ones discussed in this paper—may be at play.
Further, the model offers a potential explanation for two puzzles observed in
aggregate US consumption data. On the one hand, data exhibit excess smoothness
of consumption to current, or unanticipated, labor-income growth (e.g., Campbell
and Deaton 1989). On the other hand, the data are excessively sensitive to lagged, or
anticipated, labor-income growth (e.g., Flavin 1981). Although liquidity constraints
do not easily generate such consumption patterns in the buffer-stock model (Ludvig-
son and Michaelides 2001), they do in the reference-dependent case presented in the
previous section. Specifically, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing, the marginal
propensity to consume is strictly lower than half in the first period (consistent with
excess smoothness to unanticipated income changes), and strictly higher than half in
the second period (consistent with excess sensitivity to anticipated changes), even at
relatively low levels of income on hand for which reference-independent consumers
live hand-to-mouth.
6 Conclusion
Many laboratory experiments and observational studies provide empirical support
of the theory that preferences are reference dependent. These studies are however
restricted to settings with high bank penetration, where consumers have more access
to credit and other insurance strategies than consumers in low-income countries. The
literature on reference-dependent preferences has implicitly assumed perfect access to
credit, making it less applicable to millions of consumers with limited access to formal
and informal insurance strategies. As a result, it is unclear how reference dependence
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affects intertemporal choice in settings without well-functioning financial markets,
and how improved access to credit affects reference-dependent consumption patterns.
I therefore investigated how reference dependence affects intertemporal choice in
a context of liquidity constraints. I analyzed different models of reference-dependent
preferences in intertemporal choice, including a model in which gains and losses
compared to exogenous reference points influence well-being, and the Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) model with endogenous expectations-based reference points in which
utility is derived from both consumption and changes in beliefs. The former has the
advantage that it is tractable and easy to interpret, but misses one key ingredient,
namely how people form their reference points. The latter model with expectations-
based reference points has the advantage that it specifies a unique reference point,
thereby unifying a growing literature on prospect theory and othermodels for reference
dependence. Moreover, it integrates some key features of reference-dependent models
in a standard framework for intertemporal choice. As such, the framework can be
applied and tested for behavior outside the laboratory.
I introduced a liquidity constraint in both models to predict consumption-saving
behavior in the presence of missing credit markets. For both models, I showed that ref-
erence dependence can increase liquidity-constrained savings,while it has the opposite
effect in the absence of liquidity constraints. Two mechanisms explain this asymme-
try. First, when ex-post liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of a loss in
early periods, they may decide to take the full loss and increase savings compared to
the reference-independent case. For instance, if a consumer plans to save and smooth
consumption, but faces a moderate income loss in early periods, it is optimal to con-
sume the planned level in early periods and borrow to concentrate the full loss in
future periods. However, liquidity constraints prevent the consumer from doing so.
By diminishing sensitivity, the best feasible alternative is then to take the full loss in
early periods and save the planned amount for future periods.
Second, reference dependence can increase liquidity-constrained savings since
anticipating a liquidity constraintmay influence expected consumption ex-ante, affect-
ing expectations-based reference points. A person who knows that a binding liquidity
constraint will prevent her from smoothing consumption expects lower income in
early periods than in future periods. As a result, the planned level—and hence the
reference point—is relatively high in future periods. This increases the marginal util-
ity from future consumption, which in turn creates an ex-ante savings motive among
consumers without access to credit. Diminishing sensitivity is necessary to obtain this
result only in a framework with deterministic income, not when income is stochastic
and people anticipate the possibility of income shocks while forming their beliefs.
To conclude, this paper aims to demonstrate that one cannot directly apply exist-
ing models for reference dependence to intertemporal choice in low-income settings,
where consumers have limited access to credit and other risk-coping strategies.
One should account for the finding that reference dependence can affect savings in
opposite directions depending on whether consumers face liquidity constraints. The
propositions in this study can serve as a first guide toward testing models of reference-
dependent preferences outside the laboratory, in settings where such models have
rarely been tested.
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Appendix 1: Solution concept for endogenous reference points
This appendix derives endogenous reference points for the model presented in Sect. 3.
This model specifies the reference point as a rational expectation or belief held prior
to consumption. In this way, the reference point can be interpreted as an endogenous
consumption plan. Here, I will first discuss how Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) model the
formation of these consumption plans, and then derive endogenous consumption plans
in a context of liquidity constraints.
As discussed in the main text, two mechanisms jointly determine a plan. To start,
consumers cannot make plans ex-ante to which they cannot commit ex-post. Plans
satisfying this criterium are labeled a “personal equilibrium.” Next, out of all personal
equilibria, the consumer chooses the plan that optimizes utility ex-ante. This so-called
preferred personal equilibrium provides a unique reference point and is equivalent to
the reference-independent optimum given the preference structure in Sect. 3.
Formally, in a personal equilibrium, it is optimal to consume the initially planned
level. This rules out any dynamic inconsistencies in which the consumer sets overly
pessimistic plans to “surprise” herself with windfall utility from higher consumption.
For instance, by planning zero consumption, any outcome would be considered a gain
and create utility.19 Therefore, a personal equilibrium optimizes total lifetime utility
at t = 1 and is consistent with a consumer’s initial plan, cD(w,b) = b:
Definition 1 (Personal Equilibrium) A personal equilibrium plan b ∈ PE solves
max
c
U (c;w,b), where
cD(w,b) ≡ argmax
c
U (c;w,b) satisfies cD(w,b) = b
Figure 6 illustrates how the personal equilibrium condition restricts a consumer’s
plans. In Panel (a), the vertical axis indicates cD1 (w,b), the optimal level of period
1 consumption. This optimum depends on a consumer’s initial plan, b1, which is
indicated on the horizontal axis, and is a personal equilibrium if and only if it equals
the planned level, cD1 (·) = b1. Thus, in a personal equilibrium, the optimum intersects
the 45-degree line. This imposes an upper and lower bound for consumption plans.
When the plan is to consume more (less) than the upper bound b (lower bound b),
19 To my knowledge, the literature does not document evidence of such pessimism. In fact, consumers are
often overconfident (for a review of the literature, see Caliendo and Huang 2008).
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optimal consumption cD1 (·) is lower (higher).20 As a result, the range of personal
equilibrium plans is restricted to b1 ∈ (b, b).
Given the preference structure in Sect. 3, this set of personal equilibrium plans
is non-empty and convex since b is always lower than b. The personal equilibrium
is not necessarily unique. KR therefore restrict the solution to a so-called preferred
personal equilibrium (PPE). IndicatingU 0(b;w) as lifetime utility evaluated at t = 0,
an ex-ante period in which a consumer makes her plans, the PPE is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Preferred personal equilibrium (PPE)) The preferred personal equilib-
rium b(w) solves
max
b1∈[b,b]
U 0(b;w) = max
b1∈[b,b]
m(b1) + m(w1 + w2 − b1)
Ex-ante utility does not include gain–loss utility since the consumer has perfect fore-
sight.
Figure 6 Panel (b) indicates the preferred personal equilibrium. The figure draws
ex-ante utility,U 0(b;w), as a function of the initial plan for period 1 consumption, b1,
and highlights the range of personal equilibrium plans from Panel (a). The personal
equilibrium plan b∗ optimizes ex-ante utility and is therefore the PPE. KR show
that Condition (7) for intertemporal loss aversion implies perfect smoothing, b∗ =
w¯.21 Thus, without liquidity constraints, reference-dependent consumption plans are
equivalent to the reference-independent optimum.
I find the same result when introducing a liquidity constraint, c1 ≤ w1, as long as
a consumer is aware of this liquidity constraint when making plans. In that case, the
liquidity constraint restricts the set of feasible personal equilibrium plans to b1 ≤ w1.
Defining b and b as above, with b < b, the range of personal equilibrium plans is:
b1 ∈ PE ⇔ b1 ∈
[
min{w1, b},min{w1, b
]
.
A consumer with relatively high income in the first period,w1 ≥ w¯, can carry through
the unconstrained preferred personal equilibrium plan, w¯, but this plan is unfeasible
20 Formally, b = (b, w1 + w2 − b) is the plan at which marginal utility is zero when consumption is an
infinitesimal amount lower:
lim
c1↑b
U ′(c;w, b) = 0 ⇔ m′(b)(1 + ηλ) = m′(w1 + w2 − b)(1 + γ η)
Consuming less than planned creates a loss in period 1—with weight ηλ—and an equally sized gain in
period 2—with weight γ η. Likewise, b = (b, w1+w2−b) is defined as the planned level at whichmarginal
utility is zero for infinitesimal higher consumption:
lim
c1↓b
U ′(c;w, b) = 0 ⇔ m′(b)(1 + η) = m′(w1 + w2 − b)(1 + γ ηλ)
Consuming more than planned creates a gain in period 1—with weight η—and an equally sized loss in
period 2—with weight γ ηλ.
21 If Condition (7) is satisfied, consumers attach relatively highweight to future losses, γ ≥ 1/λ and b ≥ w¯.
As a result, w¯ is a personal equilibrium. If γ < 1/λ, then b < w¯ and w¯ is not a personal equilibrium.
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U 0(b;w)
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(b)
Fig. 6 Solution concept with an endogenous reference point. a Illustration of personal equilibrium plans.
b Illustration of a preferred personal equilibrium
for consumers with lower income, w1 < w¯. For them, the maximum feasible level
optimizes ex-ante utility and is hence the preferred personal equilibrium, w1, yielding
the reference-independent optimum:
cD(w,b∗) = b∗ = cI (w)
where cI1(w) = min {w1, w¯} and cI2(w) = max {w2, w¯}. Thus, if γ ≥ 1/λ, the
reference-dependent plan is to consume the reference-independent optimum.
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Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof Lemma 1 Instantaneous utility for a loss x < 0 is convex in the second period
if and only if
∂2u(c; b, γ )
∂c2
= m′′(c)(1 + γμ′(x)) + m′(c)2γμ′′(x) < 0.
Using the definitions for DS(x; γ ) and A(c) in Lemma 1, we can rewrite this as
follows:
DS(x; γ ) ≡ γμ
′′(x)
1 + γμ′(x) <
−m′′(c)
m′(c)2
≡ A(c)
m′(c)
(11)
By Condition (C2), DS(x; γ ) is strictly increasing in x for all x < 0:
DS′(x; γ ) ∝ γμ′′′(x)(1 + γμ′(x)) − γ 2μ′′(x)2 > γ 2
(
μ′′′(x)μ′(x) − μ′′(x)2
)
≥ 0
⇔ μ′′′(x)μ′(x) ≥ μ′′(x)2.
Thus, when a loss −x is reduced, i.e., consumption c and x are increased, DS(x; γ )
becomes larger and inequality (11) is more likely to be satisfied for a given value of
A(c)/m′(c).
Further, by Condition (C3), the latter term does not increase when a loss is reduced,
i.e., consumption is increased:
(
A(c)
m′(c
)′
∝ A′(c)m′(c) − m′′(c)A(c) ∝ A′(c) + A(c)2 ≤ 0 ⇔ A′(c) ≤ −A(c)2
As a result, DS(x; γ ) > A(c)/m′(c) for all xt ∈ (L , 0). Finally, note that the partial
derivative of diminishing sensitivity with respect to γ is proportional to
|μ′′(x)|(1 + γμ′(x)) − γ |μ′′(x)|μ′(x) = |μ′′(x)| > 0,
meaning that DS(x; γ ) is strictly increasing inγ . As a result, DS(x; 1) > DS(x; γ ) >
DS(L; γ ) = A(c)/m′(c) for all x ∈ (L , 0). This implies convexity of instantaneous
utility in both the first and the second periods, completing the proof. unionsq
Proof Proposition 1 The consumer anticipates to earn w1 > w2, which means that
the liquidity constraint is not binding and that the planned consumption path is b∗ =
(w¯, w¯) ≡ w¯. The revised reference-independent optimum does not depend on this
planned consumption path and is cI (w′) = w¯′ for all w′1 ≥ w2 and cI (w′) = w′
for all w′1 < w2. Reference-dependent lifetime utility depends on the prior plan and
reduces to:
U (c1;w′, w¯) = u(c1; w¯, 1) + u(w1 + w2 − c1; w¯, γ )
First, I rule out solutions in which a person combines a loss in one period with a gain
in the other period. For w′1 + w2 ≥ w¯, the person could take a loss in the first period
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and a gain in the second period by consuming c1 < min{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯}, or a gain in the
first period and a loss in the second period by consuming c1 > max{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯}.
Regarding the first case, consider a person combining a loss in the first period,
l1 = m(c1) − m(w¯) < 0, with a gain in the second period, g2 = m(c2) − m(w¯) > 0.
Her lifetime utility will be strictly increasing in consumption:
U ′(c1;w′, w¯) = m′(c1)(1 + μ′(l1)) − m′(c2)(1 + γμ′(g2))
> m′(c1)(μ′(l1) − μ′(g2)) > 0 ∀ c1 < min{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯} (12)
Here, the first inequality follows from c1 < c2 and γ < 1. The second inequality
follows fromAssumption (A4), loss aversion for large stakes, which says thatμ′(g) <
μ′(l) for all feasible gains g > ε and losses l < 0. We can hence rule out any solution
satisfying c1 < min{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯} if w′1 + w2 ≥ w¯.22
For the same reason, the revised optimum cannot combine a gain in the first period,
g1 = m(c1) − m(w¯) > 0, and a loss in the second period, l2 = m(c2) − m(w¯) < 0,
if γ = 1:
U ′(c1;w′, w¯) = m′(c1)(1 + μ′(g1)) − m′(c2)(1 + μ′(l2))
< m′(c1)(μ′(g1) − μ′(l2)) < 0 ∀ c1 > max{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯} (13)
By continuity, a parameter γ ∗ < 1 exists such that U ′(c1;w′, w¯) ≤ 0 for all γ ≥ γ ∗
and c1 > max{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯}. Intertemporal loss aversion combined with loss aversion
over large stakes is sufficient to make this assumption. We can hence also rule out any
solution satisfying c1 > max{w¯, 2w¯′ − w¯} if w′1 + w2 ≥ w¯.
Now I will derive the optimal solution at different levels of present income. First,
consider what happens in case present income is higher than anticipated, w′1 > w1,
so that w¯ < 2w¯′ − w¯. The two inequalities above, (12) and (13), imply that w¯ ≤
c1 ≤ 2w¯′ − w¯ and that consumption exceeds the planned level in both periods. By
Assumption (A3), lifetime utility is strictly concave. Hence, the optimum satisfies the
first-order condition:
U ′(c1;w′, w¯) = 0 ⇔ m′(c1)(1 + μ′(x1)) = m′(c2)(1 + γμ′(x2))
⇔ cD1 (w′, w¯) > cI1(w′) = w¯′ ∀ w′1 > w1
Revised consumption is higher than the reference-independent optimum because
future gains weigh less than present gains, γ < 1. This increases marginal utility
from present consumption compared to marginal utility from future consumption.
Second, consider what happens in case present income is lower than what the
person anticipated, but still higher than future income, w2 ≤ w′1 < w1, meaning
that a reference-independent consumer smooths consumption. The inequalities (12)
and (13) combined with the liquidity constraint imply that max{2w¯′ − w¯, 0} ≤ c1 ≤
22 Because anticipated present income was higher than anticipated future income, the consumer can avoid
gains in the future period while incurring a present loss by saving less.
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min{w¯, w′1}, i.e., the consumer takes a loss in both periods.23 With consumption in
both periods being at least 2w¯′ − w¯ and present income satisfying w′1 ≥ w2, the
most extreme value of this loss is −x = m(w¯) − m(2w2 − w¯). A first-order Taylor
approximation of consumption utility terms around the minimum consumption level,
2w2−w¯, implies that themaximum losswithin a period,−x = m(w¯)−m(2w2−w¯) ≈
m′(2w2 − w¯)(2(w¯ − w2)), satisfies the following condition:
−x ≈ m′(2w2 − w¯)(w1 − w2) ≤ m′
(
(3 − φ)w2
2
)
(φ − 1)w2 = −L
where the first inequality follows from inserting the restriction w1 ≤ φw2, φ > 1,
and the last equality from the definition of φ. Since x ∈ (L , 0), Lemma 1 implies
that utility from both periods—and hence lifetime utility—is convex. It is therefore
optimal to concentrate the full loss in one period.
However, if w2 ≤ w′1 < w¯, present income drops below the planned consumption
level, w¯, forcing the person to take a present loss. The corner solutions in this case
are to consume either c1 = 2w¯′ − w¯ (and c2 = w¯) or c1 = w′1 (and c2 = w2). By
convexity, the utility-maximizing consumption level is the option in which the loss
is concentrated in one period—in this case, the future. By continuity, we can define
some w < w2 for which lifetime utility is convex, so that this is satisfied for all
w < w′1 < w¯, with optimal consumption being c1 = 2w¯′ − w¯ < cI1(w′) = w′1.
Finally, ifw′1 < w, lifetime utility is not convex but concave, and strictly increasing
for all c1 < w′1. The parameter atwhich the secondderivative of lifetimeutility changes
sign,w, will always be strictly above zero if a regular Inada condition, limc↓0 m′(c) =
∞, is satisfied. The revised optimum satisfies cD1 (w′,w) = w′1 for all w′1 ≤ w. This
completes the proof. unionsq
Proof Proposition 2 Since the consumer anticipates higher income in the second than
in the first period, w2 > w1, she plans to consume c1 = w1 and c2 = w2. Thus,
reference-dependent lifetime utility reduces to:
U (c1;w′,w) = m(c1) + μ(m(c1) − m(w1)) + γμ(m(c2) − m(w2)) + m(c2)
with c2 = w′1 + w2 − c1. If w′1 ≤ w1 and first-period consumption satisfies c1 < w′1,
the consumer takes a loss in the first period, and the first derivative is:
U ′(c1;w′,w) = m′(c1)(1 + μ′(x1)) − m′(c2)(1 + γμ′(x2))
> m′(c1)(μ′(x1) − μ′(x2)) ≥ 0
for all c1 < w′1 ≤ w1, where the first inequality follows from γ < 1 and c1 < c2
and the second inequality from global loss aversion. Thus, it is optimal to consume
c1 = w′1.
23 Because w1 > w2, revised income will always exceed the left-hand side of this inequality, since
2w¯′ − w¯ = w′1 + w2 − w¯ < w′1 if and only if w2 < w¯, i.e., w2 < w1. Thus, the liquidity constraint will
not prevent the person from consuming c1 ≥ 2w¯′ − w¯.
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If w′1 = w2, the first derivative when consuming c1 = w′1 is:
U ′(c1;w′,w) = m′(w2)(1 + μ′(x1)) − m′(w2)(1 + γμ′(0+)
= m′(w2)(μ′(x1) − γμ′(0+) < 0
because x1 ≈ m′(w1)(w2−w1) and γ > μ′(m′(w1)(w2−w1))/μ′(0+). By Assump-
tion (A3), lifetime utility is strictly concave so that an interior optimum c1 < w′1 exists.
Thus, it is optimal to consume c1 < w′1.
If w′1 > w2, the reference-independent optimum is to consume w¯′ in both periods.
The first derivative of lifetime utility given this level of consumption is:
U ′(c1; w¯′,w) = m′(w¯′)(1 + μ′(x1)) − m′(w¯′)(1 + γμ′(x2))
= m′(w¯′)(μ′(x1) − γμ′(x2))
with x1 = m(w¯′)−m(w1) and x2 = m(w¯′)−m(w2). Ifw′1 = w2, we just showed that
the first derivative of lifetime utility is strictly negative, so that cD1 (w
′,w) < cI1(w′).
As w′1 becomes higher, the difference in gain–loss utility μ′(m(w¯′) − m(w1)) −
γμ′(m(w¯′) − m(w2)) will converge to zero by Condition (C2). As a result, since
γ < 1, some w∗∗ exists such that
m′(w¯′)
(
μ′(m(w¯′) − m(w1)) − γμ′(m(w¯′) − m(w2))
) = 0 with w¯′ = w∗∗ + w2
2
so that cD1 (w
′,w) > w¯′ for all w′1 > w∗∗ and cD1 (w′,w) < w¯′ for all w′1 < w∗∗. This
completes the proof. unionsq
Proof Proposition 3 This proof first analyzes reference-dependent consumption given
the plan to consume the reference-independent optimum, cI1(w) = min{w1, w¯}. At
t = 1, the optimum solves:
max
c1≤w1,c2
U (c;w, cI (·)) = max
c1≤w1,c2
m(c1) + N (c1; cI1(·)) + γ N (c2; cI2(·)) + m(c2)
c2 = w1 + w2 − c1
cD(w, cI (·)) = arg max
c1≤w1,c2
U (c;w, cI (·))
The first derivative of lifetime utility in first-period consumption, c1, is
m′(c1) + N ′(c1; B1(·)) − m′(w1 + w2 − c1) − γ N ′(w1 + w2 − c1; B2(·)).
As a first step, I find an explicit expression for the derivative of gain–loss utility,
N ′(·). Doing so, I use the probability that consumption c is higher than the reference-
independent plan for period t , Pt (c) as defined in footnote 14, with P1(c) > P2(c′)
for all c ≥ c′.
Consumption is higher than planned—so that the consumer experiences a gain—for
income realizations occurring with probability P1(c1). Because μ(x) = ηx for gains,
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the gain–loss utility from comparing consumption with these income realizations
reduces to P1(c1)η
(
m(c1) − E[m(c∗RI,1(·))|min{W1, W¯ } ≤ c1]
)
and its derivative is
ηm′(c1)P1(c1). Consumption is lower than planned—so that the consumer experiences
a loss—for income realizations occurringwith probability 1−P1(c1). Becauseμ(x) =
−ηλ(−x), the gain–loss utility from comparing consumption with these income real-
izations reduces to (1− P1(c1))ηλ
(
m(c1) − E[m(c∗RI,1(·))|min{W1, W¯ } > c1]
)
and
its derivative is ηλm′(c1)(1 − P1(c1)). The derivative of instantaneous utility in the
first period is therefore:
m′(c1) + N ′(c1; B1(·)) = m′(c1) (1 + η (λ − (λ − 1)P1(c1)))
Likewise, the derivative of instantaneous utility for period 2 consumption is:
m′(c2) + γ N ′(c2; B2(·)) = m′(c2) (1 + ηγ (λ − (λ − 1)P2(c2)))
The derivative of lifetime utility in first-period consumption, c1, now reduces to
m′(c1) (1 + η (λ − (λ − 1)P1(c1))) − m′(c2) (1 + γ η (λ − (λ − 1)P2(c2))) .
As a second step, I show that wN < w2. Evaluated at c1 = w1, and assuming that
w1 = w2 = w¯, the above derivative satisfies:
m′(w¯)η (λ − (λ − 1)P1(w¯) − γ (λ − (λ − 1)P2(w¯))) < 0
by Condition (C1)’ for all w. Because lifetime utility is concave, we can define a
period 1 wealth level wN < w2 such that the above derivative evaluated at c1 = w1 is
equal to zero:
m′(wN ) (1 + η (λ − (λ − 1)P1(wN ))) − m′(w2) (1 + γ η (λ − (λ − 1)P2(w2))) = 0
For sophisticated consumers, this effect is more pronounced and wS < wN . To see
this, note that in a personal equilibrium, the derivates of life-cycle utility for a naive
consumer will satisfy:
m′(cD1 ) + N ′(cD1 ; cI1(·)) − m′(cD2 ) − γ N ′(cD2 ; cI2(·)) = 0 ∀ w1 ≥ wN
A sophisticated consumer anticipates that her consumption in the first period will be
lower than cI1(·) for all w1 ≥ wN . The derivative of life-cycle utility in the naive
optimum will satisfy
m′(cD1 ) + N ′(cD1 ; B1(·)) − m′(cD2 ) − γ N ′(cD2 ; B2(·))
< m′(cD1 ) + N ′(cD1 ; B1(·)) − m′(cD2 ) − γ N ′(cD2 ; B2(·)) = 0 ∀ w1 ≥ wN
because N ′(c;B(·)) is increasing in the level of planned consumption and B1(·) ≤
cI1(·) ≤ cI2(·) ≤ B2(·) for all w1.
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As a third step, I analyze how reference-dependent consumption responds to
changes in income. For naive consumers, if w1 < wN , the derivative of lifetime
utility is strictly positive for all c1 ≤ w1 < wN , so that cD1 (w, cI1(·)) = w1 for all
w1 ≤ wN . If w1 > wN , the derivative is strictly negative when evaluated at c1 = w1,
and consumption satisfies the following first-order condition:
m′(c1)
m′(c2)
= 1 + γ η (λ − (λ − 1)P2(c2))
1 + η (λ − (λ − 1)P1(c1)) ≡
β2
β1
where we introduce β1 and β2 for notational convenience. The derivative of consump-
tion with respect to period t income is obtained by implicit differentiation:
∂c1
∂wt
m′′(c1)β1 =
(
1 − ∂c1
∂wt
)
m′′(c2)β2 ⇒ ∂c1
∂wt
= m
′′(c2)β2
m′′(c1)β1 + m′′(c2)β2
We can rewrite the above equation using the FOC and the definition for Arrow–Pratt
absolute risk aversion, A(c) = −m′′(c)/m′(c):
∂cD1 (w, c
I
1(·))
∂wt
= −A(c2)β1m
′(c1)
m′′(c1)β1 − A(c2)β1m′(c1)
= A(c2)
A(c1) + A(c2) ≤
1
2
∀c1 < c2, w1 ≥ wN ,
where the latter inequality follows from non-increasing risk aversion.
In the specific case of CARA preferences, A(c2) = A(c1) for all c1 < c2, so
that ∂cD1 (w, c
I
1(·))/∂wt = 1/2 for all w1 ≥ wN . Alternatively, in case of decreasing
absolute risk aversion, A′(c) < 0, the first-period propensity to consume satisfies
∂cD1 (w, c
I
1(·))/∂wt < 1/2 if w1 = wN , because c1 = w1 < w2 = c2. As a result,
c1 < c2 so that ∂cD1 (w, c
I
1(·))/∂wt < 1/2 also for higher period 1 income levels
w1 > wN .
SubstitutewN forwS and cI1(·) for B1(·) to obtain the same results for sophisticated
consumers as derived above for the case of naive consumers. This completes the proof.
unionsq
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